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Abstract 
 
Experience suggests that it is edifying to talk about software crises at NATO 
workshops. It is argued in this position paper that proper engineering of fault 
tolerance software has not been getting the attention it deserves. The paper outlines 
the difficulties in building fault tolerant systems and describes the challenges 
software fault tolerance is facing. The solution being advocated is to place a special 
emphasis on fault tolerance software engineering which would provide a set of 
methods, techniques, models and tools that would exactly fit application domains, 
fault assumptions and system requirements and support disciplined and rigorous fault 
tolerance throughout all phases of the life cycle. The paper finishes with an outline of 
some directions of work requiring special focused efforts from the R&D community. 
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Abstract 
 
Experience suggests that it is edifying to talk about software crises at NATO workshops. It is argued in this 
position paper that proper engineering of fault tolerance software has not been getting the attention it deserves. 
The paper outlines the difficulties in building fault tolerant systems and describes the challenges software fault 
tolerance is facing. The solution being advocated is to place a special emphasis on fault tolerance software 
engineering which would provide a set of methods, techniques, models and tools that would exactly fit application 
domains, fault assumptions and system requirements and support disciplined and rigorous fault tolerance 
throughout all phases of the life cycle. The paper finishes with an outline of some directions of work requiring 
special focused efforts from the R&D community. 
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Abstract. Experience suggests that it is edifying to talk about software crises at NATO 
workshops. It is argued in this position paper that proper engineering of fault tolerance software 
has not been getting the attention it deserves. The paper outlines the difficulties in building fault 
tolerant systems and describes the challenges software fault tolerance is facing. The solution 
being advocated is to place a special emphasis on fault tolerance software engineering which 
would provide a set of methods, techniques, models and tools that would exactly fit application 
domains, fault assumptions and system requirements and support disciplined and rigorous fault 
tolerance throughout all phases of the life cycle. The paper finishes with an outline of some 
directions of work requiring special focused efforts from the R&D community. 
 
1. Fault tolerance misuse 
As reported by Flavio Cristian in the 80s [1], field experience with telephone switching systems 
showed that up to two thirds of system failures were due to design faults in exception handling 
or recovery algorithms. 
Let us look into what is happening now.  
− The Interim Report on Causes of the August 14th 2003 Blackout in the US and Canada 
[2] clearly shows that the problem was mostly caused by badly designed fault tolerance: 
poor diagnostics of faults, longer-than-estimated time for component recovery, failure to 
involve all necessary components in recovery, inconsistent system state after recovery, 
failures of alarm systems, etc. 
− Tony Hoare reports [3] that in some MS systems more than 10% of code is dedicated to 
executable assertions. Yet as we all know, many customers are still unhappy with the 
quality of these products 
− The authors of an ICSE 2006 paper [4] have experimentally found that in a 10 million 
LOC real-time embedded control system, misused exception handling introduced 2-3 
bugs per 1 KLOS. 
− Another paper, just accepted to IVNET 2006 [5], shows that in eight .NET assemblies 
(which represent application, library and infrastructure levels), over 90% of exceptions 
that the code can throw are not documented.  
− Paper [6] by IBM researchers reports typical patterns of exception handling misuse and 
abuse in five customer and one proprietary J2EE applications, referring to them as “bad 
coding practice”. It was found, for example, that one in ten classes swallows exceptions 
without doing anything about them. 
We keep making mistakes in designing fault tolerance! The situation is deteriorating as the 
complexity of software and systems in general is growing, causing an increase in the complexity 
of fault tolerance, as computer-based systems proliferate more widely in business, society and 
individuals' activities.  
In spite of the fact that a plethora of fault tolerance mechanisms have been developed since the 
70s, that there is a good understanding of the basic principles of building fault tolerant software 
and that a considerable fraction of requirements analysis, run time resources, development effort 
and code are now dedicated to fault tolerance, we might well be on our way to a fault tolerant 
software crisis. At present, fault tolerance is not trustworthy as it is the least understood, 
documented and tested part of the system, is frequently misused or poorly designed, regularly 
left until too late in the development process, not typically introduced in a systematic, 
disciplined or rigorous way, and often not suitable for the specific situations in which it is 
applied.  
 
2. Fault tolerance: challenges and difficulties 
Fault tolerance means can and will undermine overall system dependability if not applied 
properly. The following are some of the main challenges in the area: 
− Fault tolerance means are difficult to develop or, when they are provided by some 
dedicated support, to use – this is because they increase system complexity by adding a 
new dimension to the reasoning about system behaviour. Their application requires a 
deep understanding of the intricate links between normal and abnormal behaviour and 
states of systems and components, as well as system state and behaviour during 
recovery. 
− Fault tolerance (software diversity, rollback, exception handling) is costly as it always 
uses redundancy. Rather than improve fault tolerance, system developers far too often 
prefer to spend resources on extending functionality. We cannot and/or do not always 
want to put a cost on failures. 
− System designers are reluctant to think about faults at the early phases of development. 
Fault tolerance is often considered to be an implementation issue. Moreover, fault 
tolerance is often “added” after the normal part of the system is developed, which 
makes it less effective, may require system redesign or result in faulty fault tolerance. 
− There is a lack of appropriate training for, education about or good practice in, fault 
tolerance:  
o We do not really know what counts as a good fault tolerant program. We 
usually know well only how to write programs and components that assume 
(unjustifiably) that nothing will go wrong 
o Developers of many applications fail to apply even the basic principles of 
software fault tolerance. There is no focus on clearly defining fault assumptions 
from the very start, early error detection, recursive system structuring for error 
confinement, minimising and ensuring error confinement and error recovery 
areas, extending component specification with a concise and complete 
definition of failure modes, etc. 
− It is imperative that fault tolerance means fit the system, the types of faults (i.e. the fault 
assumptions), the application domain, the development paradigm, the execution 
environment and the system characteristics. We need suitable fault tolerance 
abstractions for a variety of particular situations. 
 
3. Fault assumptions and application fault tolerance 
We believe that due to 
− an increase in hardware quality and a reduction in hardware cost (e.g. hardware 
replication is cheap ) 
− a dramatic rise in software complexity and volume 
− the involvement of new actors (non-professional users, multiple organisations, critical 
infrastructures) 
− a growing complexity of the environment in which systems operate, 
for many applications hardware faults are no longer the predominant threat. These applications 
include a wide range of safety-, life-, business- and money-critical systems – see, for example, 
recent studies by J.-C. Laprie [7], J. Knight [8] and by the Standish Group [9]. The predominant 
types of faults to be tolerated are  
− application software faults (including design faults)  
− environmental and infrastructural faults/deficiencies 
− potentially damaging changes in systems, components, environments and infrastructures 
− mismatches of components composed together (including mismatches of fault tolerance 
mechanisms [10]) 
− architectural and organisational mismatches and system-level inconsistencies 
− degradation of services provided by components and systems  
− organisational, human and socio-technical faults. 
Such faults cannot be tolerated (and the system recovered) by hardware or middleware means 
alone, without involving application software. This is why we need to include fault tolerance 
measures into application system development (be it top-down or bottom-up or a mix of both).  
 
4. Fault tolerance and software development  
Fault tolerance needs to be engineered in a disciplined and rigorous way. In agreement with a 
number of my colleagues working in fault tolerance, I see the way forward in pursuing the 
following directions: 
− integrating fault tolerance measures (diversity, exception handling, backward error 
recovery, etc.) into system models starting from the early architectural design 
− making fault tolerance-related decisions for each appropriate model by modelling faults, 
fault tolerance measures and dedicated redundant resources. In particular, we need to 
focus on fault tolerant software architectures 
− ensuring correct transformations of those models that enrich fault tolerance measures 
and make models more concrete and detailed 
− making fault tolerance verification and validation part of system development  
− developing dedicated tool support for fault tolerance development 
− providing domain-specific application-level fault tolerance mechanisms and 
abstractions. 
Clearly, there has been some research done in these areas. Yet if we look at the proceedings of 
some best conferences relevant to dependability and software engineering, such as ICSE, DSN, 
ESEC/FSE and EDCC, we will see that these topics are at best peripheral. It is my strong belief 
that more focused efforts are needed to achieve fault tolerance which neither fails nor requires 
fault tolerance itself. 
 
5. Where to look for solutions 
In this section I would like to briefly introduce some of the R&D directions which I believe are 
or will be contributing to the successful engineering of fault tolerance.  
Architecting fault tolerant systems is now becoming an active research area. We need to focus 
on introducing specialised architectural solutions:  
− supporting all main fault tolerance mechanisms (exception handling with error 
confinement, software diversity, atomic actions, etc.) 
− introducing specific fault tolerance solutions (such as adaptors and protective wrappers 
for COTS component integration – [11]) 
− making existing and widely accepted architectures fault tolerant  
− ensuring tolerance of architectural mismatches [12].  
It is essential that fault tolerance is supported by a set of specialised patterns and styles that 
would assist developers at all steps of the life cycle. These should include specialised 
architectural, refinement, decomposition, design, implementation and model transformation 
patterns and styles. 
Where appropriate, fault tolerance should be developed formally to ensure its “correctness by 
construction”. This needs to be supported by a development environment with a set of 
specialised tools. We should be able to model faults and fault tolerance, to express, prove and 
check specific fault tolerance properties of these models and to refine them by refining both 
fault assumptions and fault tolerance means.  
Different faults and their tolerance need to be considered at the appropriate phases of the life 
cycle and further refined and decomposed during development. This needs to start with the 
requirement phase. 
To avoid making software more complex and introducing new faults, the fault tolerance 
mechanisms and abstractions being developed should fit the types of faults, the application 
domain, the development paradigm, the execution environment and the system characteristics 
and requirements.  
Fault tolerance and fault tolerant evolution. Both system evolution and dynamic upgrade 
should ensure the preservation or the controlled and predictable changes of system fault 
tolerance. It is systems going through online modifications that are mostly vulnerable to faults, 
so we need specialised fault tolerance mechanisms that will ensure dependable modifications. 
 
Some of the recent and ongoing activities that are directly related to engineering fault tolerant 
systems: 
- RODIN - Rigorous Open Development Environment for Complex Systems, FP6 IST 
STREP project (2004-2007)1 
- FME 2005 Workshop on rigorous engineering of fault tolerant systems (REFT 2005, 
Newcastle, July 2005) and a follow-up State of the Art LNCS collection [13]  
- Workshop on engineering fault tolerant systems in Luxemburg (EFTS 2006)2. June 
2006 
- Edited collection of papers on engineering fault tolerant systems to be published in 
2007 
- A series of workshops on architecting dependable systems (WADS at ICSE and DSN in 
2002-2006)3 and three follow-up LNCS collections [14-16]. 
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